A quantum digital signature scheme based on quantum mechanics is proposed in this paper. The security of the protocol relies on the existence of quantum one-way functions by fundamental quantum principles. Our protocol involves a so-called arbitrator who validates and authenticates the signed message. This scheme uses public quantum keys publicized by the signatory to verify the validity of the signature and uses quantum one-time pad to ensure the security of quantum information on channel. To guarantee the authenticity of the transmitted quantum states, a family of quantum stabilizer code is employed. The proposed scheme presents a novel method to construct secure quantum signature systems for future secure communications.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography aims at providing information security that relies on the main properties of quantum mechanics. The most successful topic of quantum cryptography is quantum key dishbution (QKD), which was firstly invented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [I] . QKD is believed to be the first practical quantum information processor and its unconditional security has been proven [2], [3] .
Other than QKD, quantum cryptography protocols are widely studied in these years, such as quantum digitat signature and quantum message authentication. Digital signature is a main task in modern cryptography and is widely used in today's communication systems. Digital signature cares about the "authenticity" data on channel [4] . Informally, an unforgeable signature scheme requires that each user be able to efficiently generate hisfier) own signature and verify the validity of another user's signature on a specific document, and no one be able to efficiently generate the signatures of other users to documents that those users didn't sign.
Gottesman and Chuang proposed a quantum digital system
[5] based on quantum mechanics, and claimed that the scheme was absolutely secure, even against an adversary having un- In this paper, we present a novel arbitrated quantum digital signature scheme which can sign general quantum states, the security of which is based on a family of quantum one-way functions by quantum infomation theory. The rest of the article is arranged as follows.
Section 2 introduces some definitions and preliminaries we will use in the article. Section 3 describes the proposed quantum signature scheme. The security is considered in Section 4. Section 5 gives discussions and conclusions.
PI.

PRELlMINARlES
A. Quantum one-wq function
This section introduces a class of quantum one-way functions based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, which was proposed by Gottesman and we have (f(ul)tf(uz)) 5 Sm/m = 6. Here f(u) can be regarded as a class of quantum one-way functions, which are easy to compute, but difficult to reverse.
B. Quantum stabilizer codes
Quantum error cotrection code (QECC) is a way of encoding quantum data (having m qubits) into n qubits (min), which protects quantum states against the effects of noise. Quantum stabilizer code is an important class of QECC and has been used to the other subject of quantum information, such as quantum cryptography [lo] .
The Pauli operators {*I, *or, f u y r *nZ} constitute a group of order 8. The n-fold tensor products of single qubit Pauli operators also form a group G, = &{I, fa,, fa,, + C U~} , of order ZZn+'. We refer to G, as the n-qubit Pauli group. Let S denote an abelian subgroup of the la-qubit Pauli group G,. Then the stabilizer codes H s & H2zn satisfy,
The group S is called the stabilizer of the code, since it For stabilizertodes [[n, k , d] ], the generafors M, and the preserves all of the codewords.
The s:, s constitute a syndrome for the error E,, as will be the result of measuring Mi if the error E, happens. For a nondegenerate code, si ,s will be distinct for all E, E E, so that measuring.the n -k stabilizer generators will diagnose the error completely.
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
A. Security requirements
The proposed scheme is a cryptographic protocol involving three entities: a signatory Alice, a receiver Bob, and an arbitrator Trent who authenticates and validates the signed message. The security of the signature scheme depends much on the trustworthiness of the arbitrator who has access to the contents of the messages. The quantum digital signature discussed in this article should meet the following security conditions:
Each user (Alice) can efficiently generate her own signature on messages of his choice;
A receiver Bob can efficiently verify whether a given string is a signature of another user's on specific message with Trent's help; The signatory can't disavow the message that she has signed; It is infeasible to produce signatures of other users' messages they haven't signed. . 
B. The protocoi
Alice sends x and two copies of IC,(X)) to Bob. At the same time, she encrypts (s, k , z } as C1 using KAT and sends C1 and two copies of I&(X)) to Trent. We assume that each settingup o f a protocol has a unique , sequence number.
3) Verftcation:
1) Trent receives C i and two copies of ICl,(X)) = la').
Trent checks whether these two copies of lE&(x)) he recieved are equivalent by performing a quantum swap test circuit (QSTC [l I] ). Ifany one of la:)% fails the test, Trent aborts the protocol. Trent decrypts Ci using his secure key KAT and obtains {ST, k~, ZT}. He computes . XT and Alice's public keys.
/ Z K ( X ) ( T j } according to
Trent compares ICK(X)(T)) = la)^ to lEh(X)).
If any one of them fails the test, Trent aborts the protocol.
Trent encrypts { k~, q-) as Cz using K+s and sends
The comparison of two q&tum states is less straightforward than in the classical case because of the statistical properties of quantum measurements. Another serious problem is that quantum measurements usually introduce a noneligible disturbance of the measured state. Here, we use the quantum swap test circuit . (QSTC) proposed in [ l l ] to compare whether la,)^ and la:) are equivalent or not. QSTC is a comparison strategy with one-sided error probability (1 + b'/Z), and each pair of the compared qubits has an inner product with an absolute value at most 6. Because there are 2n sets of qubits to be compared, the error probability of the test can be reduced to (q)'", where (filfj} 5 6 with i # j, and 'R is the security parameter. Let the number of the incorrect keys be e,, Bob rejects it as invalid signature if e j > c M . Here c is a threshold for rejection and acceptance in the protocol. 
(7)
Bob q-decrypts p' as I$' ) according to 28.
rv. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A . Correctness
Theorem 1 (Correctness): Suppose all the entities involved in the scheme follow the protocol, then Eq. (7)'holds. Proof. The correctness o f the scheme can be seen by inspection. In the absence of intervention, Trent will obtain Alice's key s, 5, k and her signature of X. Trent verifies the signature and sends 2, k secretly to Bob. Bob can successfully decode and decipher the quantum states and verify Alice's signature. Because Alice signs her message according to Eq. (6), it's easy to verify that Eq. (7) holds.
B. Security against repudiution
Alice can't deny her signature. When Alice disavows her signature, Bob will resort to Trent. Bob sends one copy of the signature lEL(X)} to Trent. Trent compares sg and I C g ( X ) ) with ST and his kept copy of signature lEk(X)) Alice has sent to him. If all these pass the test, Trent reveals that Alice is cheating because I C K ( X ) ) contains Alice's signature on her private keys z and s. Otherwise, Trent concIudes that the signature. has been forged by Bob or other attackers.
C. Securify against forgery
Theorem 2: Other entities forge Alice's signature with a successful probability at most '2-[(w-*'~og~m~)+2n1. Proof. Considering that an adversary (Eve or Bob) controls the communication channels connecting Alice, Trent and Bob and wants to forger Alice's signature. Here we present two strategies that the attack Eve (Bob) can apply. One is that she tries to alter the signed quantum states.
Eve intercepts [d, l l & ( X ) ) ] . She keeps T' and selects a random key X E to encrypt another quantum states 16) as T and sends [T, IC'K(X) )] to Bob. Because Eve knows nothing about the stabilizer code { Q k } and syndrome s, her cheating will be detected by Bob in the fourth step of the verification phase when he compares the syndrome The second strategy is that the attacker tries to recover Alice's private keys and generates a "legal" signature. Because she knows nothing about Alice's private keys z,y,k, KAT and { U , ,~}~~~K~) .
She can't compute x, y, k from the mixed state d. According to Wolevo's theorem [lo] , Eve can obtain at most Irlogzm] bits of classical information about one of Alice's signature key { u * , j } from Alice's public key. Here, t is a small natural number and we let c = 4 in our scheme. Since she lacks 'w -trEug2m1 bits of information about any private key which Alice hasn't revealed, she will only guess correctly at most 2 -[ f~-~r '~g 2~l l of it. merefore, the attacker can forger Alice's signature only with a successful probability less than 2 -~( w -t r l a g 2 m l ) + 2 n 1 . y to y'.
1<1<2n v. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Designing quantum digital signature protocol is not trivial because of two hndamentai properties of quantum message.
The first and the most important property of quantum information is the no-clone theorem, which forbids the unknown qubits reproduction. For digital signature, bow can we verify the signature is indeed the signature on a specific state without generating copies of the original message?
The second is the probability and irreversibility properties of quantum measurement. That brings much troubles to decide whether a state is a legal signature without changing that state.
In this article, we investigate how to span these obstacles and present a quantum digital signature scheme. The security of the scheme relies on the existence of a family of quantum one-way functions by quantum principles. The authenticity of the quantum information is obtained by quantum error correction codes and security of the quantum information on channel is ensured by quantum one-time pad.
